Posted: December 12th, 2022
1-What are the pros and cons of parole. Discuss
2-Discuss ways to improve parole so that offenders have a better chance of being successful in the community
3-What are the barriers that parolees face when they return to the community that contribute to them failing
In order to receive full credit (25 points) you must use the references and you must submit at least 3 well developed paragraphs.
After you read the lecture for chapter 11, answer the following questions.
1. What is Jihadi Salafism?
2. Discuss the results of N.W. Zackie’s examination of the manual on “A Call to Global Islamic Resistance” by Abu Musab al Suri.
3. Describe the origins of al Qaeda.
Use notes to answer questions.
Chapter 11-Lecture Notes
I. Jihadist Networks
Jihadi Salafism (also referred to as Salafi Jihadism, Salafism, Salafists, or Salafis), a medieval interpretation of Islam that developed when Arabs were being threatened by Europeans. Jihadi Salafism represents a minority and frequently internally condemned interpretation of Islam, but it is a distinct theological strain of Sunni Islam supported by a global network of scholars, websites, media outlets, and social networks. Bunzel says it is deeply rooted in a theology of militancy. The Muslim Brotherhood champions one school. It formed in Egypt to oppose European imperial rule, to purify religion through education and social service, and to seek the restoration of the caliphate at some distant point in history. A more violent school, represented by ISIS and al Qaeda, seeks to purify Islam and rid Muslim lands of Western influence. ISIS embraces a more extreme intolerant version of Salafism seeking to purge the religion of what it believes are un-Islamic practices, eradicating Shi’ites, and waging offensive wars. Salafis see themselves as the only “true” Muslims, and they have assumed the authority to denounce fellow Muslims “heretics” if they disagree with Jihadi Salafi theology. William McCants (2014a) adds that Jihadi Salafism includes an apocalyptic interpretation of Islam that believes Salafis are called to usher in the final days of creation.
An organization founded by Hassan al Banna in 1928 to recapture the spirit and religious purity of the period of Mohammed and the four Rightly Guided caliphs. The Brotherhood seeks to create a single Muslim nation through education and religious reform. A militant wing founded by Sayyid Qutb sought the same objective through violence. Hamas, a group that defines itself as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, has rejected the multinational approach in favor of creating a Muslim Palestine.
Al Qaeda from Inception to 9/11 Al Qaeda’s origins can be traced to the Cold War. From 1945 until 1991, the United States and former Soviet Union fought one another with surrogates to avoid a direct superpower nuclear confrontation. Islamic radicals hated Communists for their atheism, and this drew the attention of Western intelligence agencies. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France began using radicals against the Soviets, and mod- ern jihadist power grew with Western support. Western efforts with radicals surged in 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to bolster a failing Communist regime. The United States called on Cold War allies throughout the Islamic world to support Afghan mujahedeen who resisted the Soviets. Working with Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), Saudi Arabia, and Islamic charities, the United States funneled weapons and material to the mujahedeen. Several Muslim governments also used the war as an excuse to get rid of their own radicals. They sent local militants to join one of the many mujahedeen groups and ridded themselves of sources of domestic unrest. The Afghans had a place for a wide variety of misfits. The mujahedeen were not politically united, but they had two things in common. Most were deeply religious, and they fought the Soviets with fanatical zeal. The Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, and to the mujahedeen, this symbolized a great victory for God over Satan. The United States and several Western powers turned their attention elsewhere, but many of the Jihadi Salafists mujahedeen thought it was time to carry the war to their other enemies, “heretical” Muslim governments, the West, and Israel. As foreign jihadis returned home, they carried the seeds of a new international terrorist network.
Osama bin Laden was the son of Mohammed bin Laden, a wealthy construction executive who worked closely with the Saudi royal family. The elder bin Laden divorced Osama’s mother, but he continued to provide for the family. Because of his father’s connections, bin Laden was raised in the Saudi royal court, and his tutor, Mohammed Qutb, was the brother of the Egyptian radical Sayyid Qutb. Bin Laden was influenced by Sayyid Qutb’s thoughts. Inspired by the mujahedeen of Afghanistan, bin Laden dropped out of college to join the Soviet–Afghan War. At first, he lent his support to the mujahedeen, but he later formed his own guerrilla unit (L. Wright, 2006, pp. 60–83). While in Afghanistan, bin Laden fell under the influence of Abdullah Azzam (1941–1989), a doctor of Islamic law. Azzam was a Palestinian scholar who was also influenced by Qutb’s writings. He came to believe that a purified form of Islam was the answer to questions of poverty and the loss of political power. According to Azzam, the realm of Islam had been dominated by foreign powers for too long. It was time for all Muslims to rise up and strike Satan. He saw the Soviet–Afghan War as just the beginning of a holy war against all things foreign to Islam. At first, bin Laden found the theology of Azzam to his liking and the answer to his prayers for a path to holy war. The two men created al Qaeda to serve as a future headquarters for jihad.
In April 2013, ISI entered the Syrian civil war. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi merged al Nusra and ISI into a new group, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Neither Jawlani nor Zawahiri were pleased. No longer soft-pedaling his al Qaeda core connections, Jawlani publicly swore allegiance to Zawahiri. Cafarella (2015) adds that one al Nusra commander said that they did not want to do it, but Baghdadi forced their hand. Stern and Berger say that Zawahiri sent a private letter to Baghdadi nullifying his announcement, and Baghdadi announced that he was ignoring it. ISIS would fight in Iraq and Syria. Baghadi unleashed his storm of killing in Syria, and he was soon fighting Syrian military forces, secular rebels, Hamas, Hezbollah, jihadist groups, and al Nusra. ISIS and the Caliphate Cole Bunzel (2014) says that ISIS was not an isolated entity separate from Islam. While most Muslims, including a large number of Jihadi Salafists, denounced it, ISIS had its own scholars and its own traditions stretching back to ibn Taymiyya. It controlled some of the best and most sophisticated media outlets among the Jihadist Salafi movement, and it did something that al Qaeda core failed to do. It held and governed territory. It managed oil production, ran its own banking system, operated schools and health care facilities, and established a government. In June 2014, the second most important city in Iraq, Mosul, fell to ISIS fighters. On June 29, 2014, the group’s spokesperson proclaimed that ISIS had restored the caliphate and that Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was the new caliph. From this point on, the spokesperson said, ISIS would simply be known as the Islamic State. Mainstream Muslims gave it the derogatory Arabic name, Daesh, but Jihadi Salafism had a home. Die-hard Salafists, young zealous converts, kids searching for adventure, and hundreds of Western men and women traveled to ISIS territory to join the caliphate. In their minds, the historic Islamic community had been restored.
II. Militant Scholars and Strategists
Inspired by modern Jihadi Salafist scholars, al Suri became disgusted with the elite hierarchy and unsuccessful strategy of Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda could not work because Western military forces and intelligence agencies were too strong for a small group to defeat. Al Suri called for jihad on the individual level. Simply attack a target, he said, any target anywhere in the world. This strategy will eventually result in victory. According to the SITE (2011) examination of al Suri’s 1,600-page manual, Ayman al Zawahiri said it provided a “rich river” for holy warriors.
N. W. Zackie (2013), in a scholarly examination of A Call to Global Islamic Resistance, finds that two concepts dominate al Suri’s military thinking—individual action and location. Individuals and small groups must remain isolated and secretive. Geographically, jihadists should operate in areas of the world that can sustain terrorism and guerrilla war. The work begins with a long polemical history of the Islamic world. The next section starts by analyzing the reasons the West was not crippled after 9/11 and ends with a strategy for victory. Essentially, this strategy is leaderless resistance. It covers tactics and suggests areas of the world where jihadists can be successful. Although the first part seems to be designed as a religious text, Zackie concludes that it is more of a manifesto. The second part shows that al Suri is a strategic thinker. Zackie argues that the work can be seen as a military manual, but it does more than this. It can be used to uncover the Salafi worldview. Zackie says the first section is designed to expose and convert people to militancy, get them to accept it, and then inspire them to take action. It is an exhaustive political, social, and legal treatise explaining the current plight of the Islamic world. The argument is logical within the militant puritanical strain of Islam, and it reflects common themes in religious ter- rorism. The oppressed have been victimized by the powerful, here is the evidence to prove it, this is the critical tipping point in cosmic history, it is time to strike, and the supreme deity is relying on the reader to take action. The second part contains a plan of action. Al Suri (2005) equates the struggle against the United States and its allies with “light gang warfare.” It involves urban terrorism and covert attacks, especially solo actions from wholly separate resistance cells. Jihad should take place on many fronts in all parts of the world. He states that large populated areas where movement is difficult to trace are ideal for resistance, and rugged mountainous areas provide places for concealment. Soft targets create terror, and killing anybody is justified because all non-Muslims and “heretics” are the enemy. Al Suri acknowledges that this may sound like part of the long tradition of revolutionary writings, but he concludes that Jihadi Salafists will adopt revolutionary literature and utilize its tactics.
Naji justifies rule by terror arguing that ruthlessness is necessary to create the caliphate. Abu Bakr Naji’s (2006) Management of Savagery explains the unbridled violence of groups like ISIS. He explains why it is necessary to create an Islamic state. Naji calls for organizing well-managed, functioning governing institutions. He also calls for war, merciless war, against all enemies—both internal and external. In terms of governing, Naji argues that the state must brutally conduct savage public torture and butchery against all who resist. The purpose is to frighten the enemy. It is the age-old message of terrorism. Murder victims to communicate with a larger audience. The Nazis did it secretly. Naji urges the future Islamic state to show brutal repression to the world and brag about it.
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